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Like many Americans, Uncle Sam has a bad habit of 
spending more than he earns. As Figure 1 illustrates, the 
federal government’s total expenditures exceeded its total 
revenues in 36 of the last 40 years. In 2012, federal 
government revenues were 16% of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and expenditures were 23%, leaving a deficit equal 
to 7% of GDP or $1.1billion.  
Each year of deficit spending 
results in new borrowing 
and a higher and higher na-
tional debt.  In turn, the 
growing national debt in-
creases the interest pay-
ments the government must 
make.  In 2012, debt ser-
vice—the amount the gov-
ernment must pay to cover 
the interest on the federal 
debt—was $220 billion, or 
more than the federal gov-
ernment spent on agricul-
ture, education, energy and 
transportation, combined.   
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
The  national debt is a large and 
growing problem.  Recent 
budget accords have not solved 
the debt crisis. 
 
Low interest rates worldwide 
have held the interest burden 
of the U.S. debt artificially low.  
Those days are over.   
 
In 2012, interest payments 
represented  6% of federal 
government outlays; in 2042 
they are projected to be more 
than 30%. 
 
Congress must stop the vicious 
circle of debt and debt service. 
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The typical American consumer can keep 
rolling over his credit card debts and sus-
taining his standard of living as long as a ris-
ing income covers his rising costs (and the 
bank doesn’t get too nervous about the size 
of his outstanding balance).  But if your 
spending is growing faster than your income 
and you’re only making minimum payments, 
you will soon receive a notice from VISA or 
MasterCard that your credit limit has been 
hit and cannot be increased.   
The U.S. is rapidly approaching the day 
when it too will receive such a notice.  As 
shown in Figure 2, the national debt as a 
percentage of GDP stands at 73% in 2012, 
and according to projections from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
could rise to more than 100% by 2026.  Un-
less dramatic policy changes are taken, it 
will not be VISA or MasterCard issuing a 
nasty letter.  Instead it will be international 
currency markets telling us that dollar-
denominated debt is no longer considered a 
safe investment. International credit mar-
kets will demand ever rising interest rates in 
exchange for holding our debt, and the U.S. 
will have no option but to pay it. 
THE ROLE OF INTEREST RATES 
 
Over the last few years, the weak worldwide 
economy has allowed the Federal Reserve to 
pursue a policy designed to drive down long 
term interest rates by buying longer term 
U.S. treasury debt and refinancing it with 
Ta
yl
o
r 
an
d
 G
ri
ffi
n
 |
 D
eb
t 
C
ri
si
s 
| 
V
o
lu
m
e 
5
 |
 Is
su
e 
1
 |
 J
an
u
ar
y 
2
0
1
4
 
In 2012, the interest 
on the federal debt 
was $220 billion, or 
more than the 
federal government 
spent on agriculture, 
education, energy 
and transportation, 
combined.   
Figure 1: Total U.S. Federal Government 
Revenues and Expenditures, as a Percent of GDP
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Sources: U.S. Congressional Budget Office and U.S. Government Accountability Office (Spring 2013).
Note: The forecast comes from GAO’s alternative simulation, which is based on the Trustees’ assumptions for Social Security and the 
CMS Actuary’s alternative assumptions for Medicare.  
Figure 2: The National Debt as a Percent of GDP
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Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office and U.S. Government Accountability Office (Spring 2013).
Note: The GAO’s alternative simulation is based on the Trustees’ assumptions for Social Security and the CMS Actuary’s alternative 
assumptions for Medicare.  The CBO baseline forecast was extended by the GAO.  
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
Extended Baseline Forecast
very short term debt at low interest rates.  
As a result, the interest rate the federal gov-
ernment paid on its debt in 2012 was less 
than half the interest rate it paid in 2008 
and less than one-third of the interest rate it 
paid in 1998 (Figure 3).  
With low worldwide rates on short term 
debt, the interest burden of the U.S. debt has 
been held artificially low.  Those days are 
over.  As the Federal Reserve winds down its 
stimulus efforts, interest rates will undoubt-
edly rise back toward historical norms.   
Rising interest rates mean a larger deficit 
and an even larger debt.  Figure 4 shows 
how debt service expenditures would be 
impacted by rising interest rates and a ris-
ing debt.  The red line shows the cost of debt 
service under what many consider the best 
case scenario (the Congressional Budget 
Office baseline, as extended by the GAO).  
The blue line shows the cost of debt service 
under the GAO’s alternative simulation, 
which unlike the CBO baseline uses cost 
projections generated by the agencies most 
directly involved (the Trustees’ projections 
for Social Security and the Centers for Medi-
care & Medicaid Services Office of the Actu-
ary’s projections for Medicare.) 
Both the CBO and the GAO projections as-
sume that the interest rate on federal debt 
will rise sharply over the next few years, but 
never exceed 5%.  The black line shows how 
the cost of debt service would rise  under 
the GAO’s alternative simulation if interest 
rates were one percentage point higher than 
originally assumed each year.  As the figure 
clearly demonstrates, when the debt is 
large, even modest increases in interest 
When the debt is 
large, even modest 
increases in interest 
rates could lead to 
disastrous increases 
in the cost of debt 
service.  
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Figure 4: Debt Service as a Percent of GDP under 
Alternative Scenarios
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Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office, U.S. Government Accountability Office (Spring 2013) and author’s calculations.
Note: The GAO’s alternative simulation is based on the Trustees’ assumptions for Social Security and the CMS Actuary’s alternative 
assumptions for Medicare. The CBO baseline forecast was extended by the GAO. 
Figure 3: The Interest Rate on Federal Debt
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Sources: Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Congressional Budget Office and author’s calculations.
Note: 30-year U.S. Treasuries were not issued in 2003, 2004 or 2005.  The composite interest rate is a weighted average of the 
interest rate paid on new and existing debt.
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rates (as could easily happen if the world 
begins to doubt the credit worthiness of the 
United States) could lead to disastrous in-
creases in the cost of debt service.     
THE DEBT SERVICE BURDEN 
 
All available evidence suggests that debt ser-
vice will grab a bigger and bigger portion of 
GDP just to finance our past profligacy.  It 
will also grab an increasing share of federal 
government expenditures.  In 2012, debt 
service was 6% of total expenditures by the 
federal government; according to the GAO 
alternative simulation, by 2042, debt service 
will comprise more than 30% of federal gov-
ernment expenditures.   Such a large debt 
service burden is unsustainable. 
The larger is the deficit spending, the larger 
the debt, and the larger the debt, the higher 
the interest costs which in turn only increas-
es deficit spending.  It is a vicious circle that 
policy makers must have the courage to ad-
dress. 
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